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ABSTRACT 
This paper studies the incentives of the private provider, but also of the public authority, under various 
contractual forms of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). A critical aspect of any PPP contract is the 
allocation of demand risk between the public authority and the private provider. I show that contracts in 
which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to 
customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears 
demand risk, i.e. they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the 
service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then 
more incentives to be responsive. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand 
risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff 
in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy 
implication of this paper would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where 
private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. I apply these results to understanding 
three famous case studies.  
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1. Introduction 
Reforming (local) public-service delivery occupies a central position in the current 
policy agenda in the world. Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), which are contracts 
between public and private sector to build and operate infrastructure for public-service 
provision, are considered as an alternative model to the traditional public provision for 
public services. Nevertheless, many concerns have been raised regarding this emerging 
organisational model (see Engel et al., 1997; Guasch, 2004; Chong et al., 2006; Estache, 
2006; Martimort and Straub, 2006; Athias and Nunez, 2008; Guasch et al., 2008). The 
most stringent worries concern the ex post adaptation inflexibilities inherent to these 
long term contracts. Adaptation is important when consumers preferences change and 
improved policies or technologies are discovered. As the major feature of PPPs is that 
they are long-term service contracts, it is highly likely that contracting parties will be 
unable to write complete contracts that cover all contingencies, and numerous are the 
cases that offer good illustrations of the difficulties for procuring authorities to reaching 
an agreement with private public-service providers on contractually unanticipated 
service adaptations. It is often noted that ‘[a] key concern with long-term PPP contracts 
is the level of flexibility that they offer to authorities to make changes either to the use 
of assets or to the level and type of services offered’ (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005: 
33).  
Except Ellman (2006), studies have always explained the ex post adaptation 
problems by the distorted incentives for the private public-service provider to invest in 
the research into innovative approaches to carrying out the service provision (Hart, 
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Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Hart, 2003; Bennett and Iossa, 2006). None of them 
approach this issue from a political point of view; that is none of them give an active 
role to public authorities. However, it seems that public authorities have also an 
important role to play in the adaptation of private public-service provision over time for 
the following reasons. First, any PPP is between a public authority and a private public-
service provider; that is there is no direct democracy (the public cannot vote directly to 
select and oust the private provider). Second, there is no market accountability of 
private providers, since the price applied to consumers, if any, is a regulated price, not a 
market price. Finally, public authorities, as elected delegates of consumers, are duty 
bound to discover adaptations and consumers preferences and to exercise pressure on 
the private provider to adapt the public service to satisfy the changes in the effective 
consumers demand. It seems then that political accountability, i.e. the responsiveness of 
public authorities to consumers concerns, has also to be considered when one aims to 
tackle the issue of the inefficient development of PPPs over time. In other words, public 
authorities have to be considered as active players instead of passive bystanders of the 
general efficiency of PPPs. 
Ellman (2006) is the first to theoretically raise the question of the accountability of 
public authorities in the adaptation over time of the private provision of public services. 
In this paper, the author compares political accountability whether the public-service 
provision is public or private, boiling down to a control rights issue. However, it is now 
clear that the term PPP recovers a broad range of contractual agreements that differ in 
terms of risks allocation between the public authority and the private provider (Grout 
and Stevens, 2003; Athias and Saussier, 2007; Iossa and Martimort, 2008). As ‘the devil 
is in the details’, it seems at least as important to analyse political accountability 
according to the contractual design of PPPs. This is precisely what this article aims to 
do. In particular, a critical aspect of any PPP contract is the allocation of demand risk 
between the public authority (central or local) and the private provider. Broadly 
speaking there are two main contract types for delegating public services to private 
operators: contracts where private providers bear no demand risk, hereafter designated 
as availability contracts, and contracts where private providers bear all demand risk, 
hereafter designated as concession contracts.  
To investigate how the allocation of demand risk between the public authority and 
the private provider affects politicians responsiveness to consumers concerns and the 
private provider’s incentives to reduce costs, I present a simple incomplete contract 
theory model in which (1) procuring authorities are involved in adaptation, i.e. exert 
non contractible effort to respond to consumers demands; (2) consumers may have the 
power to sanction private providers; (3) private providers exert non contractible efforts 
to cut costs. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk 
motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to 
the fact that under a concession contract consumers are empowered, i.e. have the 
possibility to oust the private provider, which provides procuring authorities with more 
credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, 
I show that there is a lower matching with consumers preferences over time when 
demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider. In other 
words, I show that contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk 
rule more out the accountability – regarding service adaptations – of procuring 
authorities. However, I show that contracts in which the private provider does not bear 
demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. 
I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and 
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allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this paper would be that the 
current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or 
no demand risk may not be optimal. I apply then these results to understanding three 
famous case studies. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature. In 
Section 3, I present the basic model of contracting parties incentives under both types of 
PPP and solves it. In Section 4, I apply the model to understanding three famous case 
studies (British school catering, London Underground, and French Highway). Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Literature Background  
Contractual Choices and Incentives 
My work is linked to the incomplete contract literature, while focusing on the 
contractual design, instead of ownership structures1. Hart et al. (1997) show that if 
assets are owned by the private sector, then cost-reducing changes can be introduced 
without renegotiation since the contract with the public sector is on services. Thus, the 
full benefit of such changes flows to the private owner and encourages efficiency. By 
contrast, benefits that improve service quality require renegotiation and the public body 
may be in a position to extract part of the benefit since the private owner has no 
alternative purchaser for the incremental gain. The effect is that the private owner 
receives less of the benefit of such changes and the incentives are weakened. As a 
consequence, Hart (2003) advocates that, where build contracts are easy to specify but 
service contracts are not, then it is useful to have a conventional provision 
(“unbundling” of the construction and operation stages). At the other extreme, where 
service contracts are easy to write and build contracts are difficult, the PPP approach 
may be particularly sensible. Bennett and Iossa (2006), in turn, show that PPPs will be 
optimal only when the innovation in the construction stage has a positive externality on 
operation and maintenance costs. 
In contrast with these studies, I approach the issue of contractually unanticipated 
service adaptation not only from the point of view of the distorted incentives for the 
private public-service provider, but also from a political point of view. Ellman (2006) is 
the unique author to our knowledge that theoretically raises the question of the 
accountability of public authorities in private provision of public services. More 
precisely, in this paper, the author compares privatisation with public provision 
regarding political and public accountability. To this end, he relies on the framework of 
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) but considers that the government and the public are 
involved in service adaptation. He shows that privatisation can, first, demotivate the 
government from investigating and responding to public demands because privatisation 
allows the provider to hold up service adaptations, and, second, demotivate the public 
from mobilising to pressure for service adaptations, since providers indirectly hold up 
the public by inflating the government’s cost of implementing these adaptations. Thus, 
in this paper, the tradeoff is between public and private provision. By contrast, I 
consider in this paper private public-service provision under PPPs, which can take 
various contractual forms (Grout and Stevens, 2003; Athias and Saussier, 2007; Iossa 
and Martimort, 2008). In other words, I consider whether the various contractual forms 
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of PPPs impact on contracting parties incentives, and more specifically on 
accountability mechanism.  
My work is also linked to the literature on the political economy of government 
responsiveness. For instance, Besley and Burgess’s (2001 and 2002) model derives how 
governments become more responsive to people when people become more aware of 
how government actions affect them, which is determined by the freedom of the press. 
Also, Besley and Ghatak (2003) tackle the question of the best process by which service 
providers, consumers and procuring authorities come together to create an organization. 
This could be governed by choice, as when a parent picks a school for their child, or by 
government policy. The authors show, in a non-formalized way, that empowering 
consumers, by allowing them to choose between providers with different service 
provisions, is a potentially source of welfare improvements. They explain that 
empowering consumers means that the nature of the principal-agent problem changes. 
While the centralized model of public-service provision (illustrated in Figure 1) has two 
layers of agency problems: between consumers and elected officials and between the 
government and the service provider, the structure of the problem when consumers of 
public services are empowered (as shown in Figure 2), provides a closer link between 
them and service providers. Thus, empowering consumers can offer a better matching 
between consumers and providers, in other words a greater allocative efficiency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This approach underpins the representation developed in this paper of the 
accountability mechanism for service adaptations under the two differing contractual 
procedures. While the centralized model of public-service provision, illustrated in 
Figure 1, corresponds to the accountability structure implied by an availability contract, 
the model in which consumers are empowered (Figure 2) fits with the accountability 
structure of a concession contract (or more generally of models in which private 
providers bear demand risk, e.g. shadow toll contracts). As a matter of fact, under 
concession contracts, consumers are empowered to the extent that the remuneration of 
the private provider depends on the demand for the service. Thus, under such contracts, 
consumers have the power to oust the service provider by not using the service anymore 
and hence make the private provider go bankrupt. This is in line with what Hirschman 
(1970) calls “Exit”. Making the private provider bear demand risk can then empower 
consumers, which can then lead to a better alignment on service provision preferences.  
 
PPP contracts 
This paper also contributes to a more applied literature that documents the efficiency of 
PPP contracts. In order to develop their infrastructure, public authorities (central or local 
Figure 1 
Consumers  
 
Procuring authority 
 
Private public-service provider 
Figure 2 
Procuring authority         Consumers 
 
    Private public-service provider 
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authorities) may decide to resort either to traditional procurement contracts or to PPPs. 
The key difference between PPPs and traditional procurement contracts is that under 
PPPs, the private sector delivers services for the duration of the contract, and not assets, 
although the provision of assets is often integral to the services concerned. They are 
therefore not only responsible for the delivery of assets, but also for the overall 
management of the project, its implementation, and its successful operation for several 
years thereafter. PPPs are thus complex long-term agreements that involve non-
verifiable investments, usually for the delivery of complex services, or at least of 
services in which the degree of uncertainty is high. 
Broadly speaking there are two main contract types for delegating public services to 
private operators: contracts where private providers bear no demand risk, hereafter 
designated as availability contracts, and contracts where private providers bear all 
demand risk, hereafter designated as concession contracts2. Both are long-term, global 
contracts on the design, building, financing and operation of a public service and consist 
in output specifications systems. Both contracts can be considered as fixed-price 
contracts (the procuring authority offers the private provider a prespecified price for 
completing the project in both contracts). They do not differ in the magnitude of 
implication of the private operator, both contracting procedures formally delegate to the 
private provider sufficient residual control rights to provide the service free of 
interference. The main difference between these two contractual practices concerns 
demand risk, which is borne by private providers in the first case and by public 
authorities in the second case. Thus, under a concession contract, the private provider’s 
remuneration depends on the demand for the public service whereas under an 
availability contract, it comes from service payments by the procuring authority 
according to performance criteria (the contract specifies penalties in case the 
performance and quality criteria are not met); there is therefore no link with the service 
demand.  
The traditional model of PPPs in the world has been the concession contract. 
According to the World Bank’s private participation in infrastructure database, between 
1990 and 2000, overall 65 per cent of the projects in Latin America and the Caribbean 
were adjudicated as concessions. The concession contract is also the most common 
form of PPP in Europe except in the UK, where, even though concession contracts are 
used, the procuring authorities resort above all to availability contracts, designated by 
the acronym PFI ‘the Private Finance Initiative’ and its successor the Public Private 
Partnerships (PPP). But the concession contracting model has increasingly come under 
fire in recent times (Guasch, 2004; Estache, 2006; Athias and Nunez, 2008; Engel et al., 
2009). The main criticisms are related with the high incidence of renegotiation observed 
under these contracts due mainly to the demand overestimation, strategic or not, by 
private providers in their bids. The trend has been then to not impose the demand risk 
on private providers anymore. Availability contracts are therefore increasingly being 
adopted around the world to move away from the concession model. This is particularly 
pronounced in Europe, where countries have recently promulgated guidelines so as to 
bring in the availability contract as an alternative to the concession contract, e.g. the 
June 2004 act in France instituting the new “contrats de partenariat”. 
While it is commonly thought that availability contracts are used when it is not 
possible to make users pay or when the services are not profitable, we observe in 
practice, on the one hand, that some contracts specify that the service provider is 
remunerated according to the service demand even if users do not pay (they are most 
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often known under the name of “shadow toll contracts”) and, on the other hand, that 
procuring authorities resort to availability contracts, and hence make the remuneration 
of the service provider dependent on continuity of service supply, while users pay a toll 
to the procuring authorities. Thus, it appears that the choice between a concession and 
an availability contract, that is to say between a contract in which the private provider 
bears demand risk and a contract in which it does not, depends neither on the ability to 
make users pay nor on the profitability of the service in question3.  
 
3. The Model 
I consider two actors, a procuring authority PA  (e.g. a mayor, local government) and a 
private service provider PM  (private manager), as well as a special third player, the 
users of the public service (the consumers) C, that can influence PA  and PM  but 
cannot negotiate contracts with them. More specifically, I assume in this model that 
consumers play a role only through their ability to sanction the private provider when 
the latter bears the demand risk. In other words, in this model, consumers are considered 
as a semi-player to the extent that I do not analyse the interactions between them and 
public authorities, assuming that public authorities always reflect consumers 
preferences. Such an assumption is motivated by the fact that I consider core public 
services, to which consumers are very sensitive, and hence the adaptations they require 
are most often politically salient.  
PA  organises the service provision on the consumers behalf and always delegates 
the service provision to a private manager ( PM ). PA can however choose between a 
contract in which the private provider does not bear demand risk (an availability 
contract) and a contract in which the private provider bears demand risk (e.g. a 
concession contract). As already mentioned, the main difference between these two 
contractual forms lies in the power conferred to consumers who, in case of 
dissatisfaction with the public service provision (e.g. non adaptation to their 
preferences), can sanction PM  when PM  bears demand risk. In fact, if consumers do 
not use the service, the remuneration of PM  will be affected. Nevertheless, it is not a 
case of “direct democracy” in the sense that the contract remains between PA  and 
PM only, neither about market accountability since the price (or toll if consumers pay) 
paid to PM  for the provision of the public service is the price regulated by the contract 
(not a market price). Thus, under both types of contract, if an adaptation is required, not 
only the adaptation but also and above all the price adaptation will have to be negotiated 
between PA  and PM . Service adaptation can therefore occur only if PA  and PM  
reach an agreement on the adaptation and the price adaptation. The hope is then that 
PA  will pressure PM  to adapt the public service to satisfy the changes in the effective 
demand. The demand risk allocation matters because it affects payoffs in case of default 
of renegotiation.  
Benchmark Model 
At the start of their relationship, PA  and PM  negotiate a basic contract X , that 
imposes demand risk either on PA  (availability contract) or on PM (a concession 
contract). I assume that X  just compensates PM  for standard costs of provision, 
whatever the contractual design. 
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 I do not consider the cost of public funds because, in both contractual procedures, 
the remuneration of the private provider can stem either from users tolls or from public 
funds.  
 X  generates a (net) payoff of b  for PA  and )(ew  for PM , where )(ew  is PM ’s 
cost advantage (over a standard provider) from investing e  in specialising to PA 4. In 
other words, I assume that this cost-reduction investment e  by PM  is fully 
relationship-specific, i.e. if PM  does not provide some service for PA , neither PM  
nor PA  gets any benefit from e .  
The investment e  is not contractible and nor is its payoff implication )(ew . The 
following regularity assumption guarantees sufficiency of first-order conditions. 
ASSUMPTION 1. 0)0( w , 0)('0)(''  eewew ,  )('lim 0 ewe , 
.0)('lim  ewe  
The overall payoffs for PM  and PA  do not depend on the contractual form. If 0t  is 
the payment that PM  receives for the provision of the basic public service, PA  and 
PM ’s overall payoffs from X  are: 
0tbuPA   
eewtuPM  )(0  
 
Adaptation and Political Accountability 
While PM  invests e  to cut costs, PA , for the various grounds mentioned above, 
invests effort i  to discover what the consumers want and how to satisfy their demands. 5 
So i  represents PA ’s efforts to pay attention to consumers concerns about service 
quality. For instance, when there is a consumers demand for a concrete change, i  raises 
the probability that PA  recognises that the demand is serious and raises the probability 
that PA  works out (in terms of pressure exercised on PM ) how to satisfy consumers 
demands. This effort permits then PA  and PM  to adapt the basic contract X  to 
changing consumers preferences.  
I denote the corresponding adapted contract by Z , again with the non-contingent 
transfer set to just compensate the standard cost of provision. For simplicity, I assume 
that e  helps PM  to satisfy Z  so that PM ’s net payoff from enforcement of contract 
Z  is again )(ew . In other words e  reduces PM ’s costs by the same amount whether 
providing the basic or the adapted service. PA ’s additional surplus from Z  is )(iv  
where 0v , increasing and concave in i , represents the net gain in consumers welfare 
from the adaptation. In other words, )(iv  measures PA ’s success in identifying or 
discovering adaptations that are valued by consumers. So )(iv  can be interpreted as a 
measure of PA ’s responsiveness to consumers demand – how likely it is that PA  
manages to please consumers. Attentiveness i  raises PA ’s ability and propensity to 
respond.  
If PA  pays PM  subsequent transfers (or toll increases) t  in case of adaptation, 
then, normalizing time discounting to zero, PA  and PM ’s overall payoffs from Z  are: 
itivtbuPA  )(0  
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eewttuPM  )(0  
The investment i  is not contractible and nor is its payoff implications )(iv . The 
following regularity assumption guarantees sufficiency of first-order conditions: 
ASSUMPTION2. 0)0( v ,   )('0)('' iviv   0i ,  )('lim 0 ivi , 
0)('lim  ivi  0i . 
Parties are risk-neutral and PA  has rational expectation about the renegotiation 
process when it makes its investments, i.e. it can make correct calculations about the 
expected returns from any action. I assume information is symmetric and PM  and PA  
negotiate a symmetric Nash bargain.6 Contractual design matters because it affects 
default outcomes in bargaining and hence the equilibrium choices of i  and e . The 
timing of the model is as follows: 
Stage 0: Demand risk is either on PA  or on PM  and contract X specifies the 
basic remuneration of the service provider 0t . 
Stage 1: PA  and PM  sink their investments i  and e .  
Stage 2: Renegotiation takes places to allow the adaptation to be implemented in 
the service provision: PA  and PM  negotiate over stage 3 the contract Z  and 
additional transfer t  (or toll increases). 
 Stage 3: PA  and PM  trade (jointly or with their market alternatives). 
 
The remuneration 0t  agreed at stage 0 cannot depend on observed investments, for it 
is not possible to specify in advance the delivery of a specific adaptation. So it plays no 
role in determining investment efficiency. The subsequent transfer t , negotiated on top 
of contract Z at stage 2, is the share of PA ’s adaptation surplus that PA  in equilibrium 
has to give to PM , in excess of its adaptation costs. This share depends on the stage 2 
default payoffs which in turn depend on the demand risk allocation, as I will show. 
PM  is assumed to maximize its profits. PA  maximizes the social benefit, net of the 
payment to PM . In this setting, the first-best levels of investments ( **,ie ) maximize 
eewiivb  )()( . Hence, they satisfy 
1*)('* ivi , 1*)('* ewe  with **,ie >0. 
As both contracts are with a private provider, in default of renegotiation, I assume 
that PA  is not able to exploit entirely investments i . This is due to the fact that under 
each type of contractual design, PA  and PM  commit to X  at stage 0. PA  cannot 
therefore switch to alternative trades (except in case of contract breach, which is 
prohibitively expensive). However PA  might still engage in “side-trades” with another 
provider (private or public) 'PM  to provide the service adaptation, alongside the basic 
public service provided by PM  (this might be possible either through the 
implementation of a new provider, or through the resort to already available alternative 
provisions).7 Nevertheless, this market access by PA  is rarely so effective: (1) PA  may 
not be able to credibly duplicate the basic service by buying the adapted service from 
'PM  unless the additional value from adaptation is very high; (2) even when it is 
technologically feasible to have 'PM  provide the adaptation service without the basic 
service, this would waste the economies of scope from having a single party provide 
and coordinate them. To capture PA ’s reduced market access in case of default of 
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renegotiation, I assume that PA  only appropriates a fraction )1( k of the adaptation 
return )(iv 8, where ]1,0]k  captures the “market-shielding” effect of PPP. This actually 
boils down to an asset-specificity effect. In addition, PM ’s side-trading returns are 
independent of i  and e , so I normalise PM ’s additional side-trade value to 0. 
Effort when demand risk is on the public authority 
When demand risk is on PA , PA ’s default payoff is:  
iivktb  )()1(0         
Normalising PM ’s alternative payoff to 0, PM ’s default payoff is eewt  )(0 . This 
is due to the fact that the contract protects PM ’s cost-reduction efforts since PA  has to 
pay a fixed price for the basic service, provided that performance criteria are met. So 
PM  appropriates the full cost reduction surplus )(ew .  
PA ’s maximal gain from renegotiation is therefore )(ikv . PA  and PM ’s renegotiation 
gains are ½ of this sum. So PA  chooses i  to maximise 
  iikvivktb  )(21)()1(0       (1) 
and PM  chooses e  to maximise 
  eikvewt  )(21)(0        (2) 
The first-order conditions are now 
 
           (3) 
 
 
Effort when demand risk is on the private provider 
When the private provider bears demand risk, consumers are empowered to the extent 
that they can sanction the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service 
provision. The magnitude of this faculty depends mainly on the availability of 
alternative providers (in the case of a tramway, for instance, consumers could sanction 
the private provider by using the bus or taking the car).9 So I use the parameter λ to 
capture the impact of the pressure exercised by consumers on PM ’s remuneration, 
where ]1,0[ . Notice that for 0 , i.e. to make PM  experience null or negative 
profits, it is not necessary that all consumers switch to an alternative provision. Indeed, 
the profitability of most concessions contracts is very sensitive to the demand, i.e. a 
marginal change of the demand can generate negative profits for the private provider. 
The case of 1  corresponds to a contract in which demand risk is on the public 
authority (an availability contract).10 
When PM  bears demand risk, PA  has more power and credibility to exploit 
investments i . For instance, if I consider that the number of consumers that switch to an 
alternative provider in case of default of renegotiation is such that 0 , implying no 
profits for PM  and then bankruptcy, PA  is then able to appropriate the full margin 
return )(iv  by negotiating with 'PM  (no market-shielding effect any more) because 
PA  is able to switch – instead of side-trading – to alternative trading. Thus, if the 
impact of the pressure exercised by consumers on PM ’s remuneration is λ, PA ’s 
default payoff is 
iivktbiivktb  )()1()())1()1(( 00   
1)(' ew
k
iv  2
2)('
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In default of renegotiation, PM  may not appropriate the full cost reduction )(ew , 
since the demand for the service can be reduced. PM ’s default payoff when he bears 
demand risk is then 
eewt  )]([ 0  
PA ’s maximal gain from renegotiation is therefore  
)()1()( ewikv    . 
The gain from renegotiation is shared between the parties through a Nash-bargaining 
solution, so PA  chooses i  to maximise 
                (4) 
and PM  chooses e  to maximise 
                  (5) 
 
The first-order conditions are now 
                    (6) 
 
Accountability and Incentives Comparisons 
Political Accountability 
The above first-order conditions demonstrate how a contract in which the private 
provider bears demand risk increases PA ’s incentives to support adaptations from the 
marginal incentive 2)2( k  of )(' iv in equation 3 to 2)2( k  of )(' iv  in equation 6. 
Thus, whether demand risk is on PA  or on PM , PM  is able to hold up part of the 
surplus generated by PA ’s investments i  because PA  has a limited access to the 
market in case of default of renegotiation. But this PM ’s hold up is function of λ  when 
PM  bears demand risk: the greater the impact of the pressure exercised by consumers 
on PM ’s remuneration, i.e. the smaller λ, the smaller the renegotiation surplus for PA , 
so the smaller the holdup of PM  of PA ’s adaptation investments. In addition, in the 
case of 0 , PA ’s incentives to support adaptations when the private provider bears 
demand risk, are equivalent to the first-best incentives level. Accordingly, 
)(),(* ACtyContractAvailabiliCCContractConcession iii    for any λ. The following proposition records 
these points. 
PROPOSITION 1. Procuring authorities are more attentive and responsive to 
consumers demand when the private provider bears demand risk. This political 
accountability increases with the impact of the pressure exercised by consumers on 
PM ’s remuneration (i.e. 0 ) .  
So, ACCC ii )( 1 , and                      0 . 
 
Proof. See Appendix  
 
The Proposition 1, illustrated by the following Figure 3, states that the model in 
which the private provider bears demand risk (like in concession contracts) always 
dominates the model in which the private provider does not bear any demand risk (like 
in availability contracts) regarding the political accountability, i.e. regarding the 
1
2)('  ewkiv  2
2)('
  iewivkivktb  )()1()(
2
1)()1(0 
  eewivkewt  )()1()(
2
1)]([ 0 
0)( 

d
diCC
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incentives given to the procuring authority to invest efforts to pay attention to 
consumers changing demands. Intuition follows from the fact that when the private 
provider bears demand risk, the potential sanction from consumers increases the public 
authority’s credibility in side-trading. 
 
Figure 3: Illustration of equilibrium levels of political accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Private provider’s cost-reducing incentives 
The above first-order conditions also demonstrate that the allocation of demand risk on 
PM  rather than on PA  decreases PM ’s cost-cutting incentives. As a matter of fact, 
the model shows that for λ equal to 1, PM ’s cost-cutting incentives are equivalent and 
optimal whatever the demand risk allocation. However, when λ tends towards 0, PM ’s 
cost-cutting incentives when he bears demand risk, CCe , tend to be smaller than under 
an availability contract and under-optimal. So, 
 ),()(* CCContractConcessionACtyContractAvailabili eee   for any λ. The following proposition 
records these points. 
PROPOSITION 2. Private provider’s incentives to cut provision costs are more 
optimal when he does not bear demand risk. Increasing the impact of the pressure 
exercised by consumers on PM ’s remuneration, i.e. a smaller λ, decreases the 
private provider’s incentives to invest in cost-reducing efforts. So, 
)(CCAC ee  1 , and 0)( 
CC
d
de

  0 . 
Proof. See Appendix  
Proposition 2 highlights the fact that the contract in which demand risk is on the 
public authority always dominates the contract in which demand risk is on the private 
provider regarding the private provider’s incentives to cut costs, as illustrated by Figure 
4. 
 
 
 
 
1 
iACi  *i  
)(' iv  
CCi  
k2
2  
k2
2  
- 13 - 
 
Figure 4: Illustration of equilibrium levels of private providers’ cost-reducing 
incentives 
  
 
  
CCAC ee* = e  1    CCe  0   
2 
1 
' w   
e
 
 
The model highlights then a tradeoff between productive efficiency (demand risk on 
the public authority) and allocative efficiency (demand risk on the private provider) in 
demand risk allocation. Thus, demand risk will be more likely on the private provider 
(a) when the benefits from adaptation are important (and when the sanction power of 
consumers is significant); (b) when the benefits from cost-reducing efforts are weak.     
 
 
4. Case Studies  
This section illustrates the underlying logic of the model in the context of three case 
studies.  
The British School Catering Case  
The recent experience of the British government with school dinners offers a good 
example of the incentives provided by an availability contract, i.e. a contract in which 
the private provider does not bear demand risk. According to Ellman (2006), ‘In the 
aftermath of a series of television reports on school diners by celebrity chef Jamie 
Oliver in early 2005, the government rushed to quench mounting public discontent over 
low quality committing to make improvements. However, new schools locked into 25-
year contracts through private finance initiatives (PFIs) are finding that they cannot rid 
their menus of junk food despite the government’s pledge’.  
Note that PFI contracts are typical availability contracts. In this case, we can observe 
that the private provider, who does not bear demand risk, invested in cost reducing 
efforts whereas the procuring authority had very low power to make the private provider 
adapt the service according to the fundamental change in the consideration of healthy 
food by the public. This perfectly illustrates Propositions 1 and 2 of our model, which 
state that there is weak adaptation under an availability contract whereas the cost 
reducing efforts of the private provider are high. 
If I now consider the features of this case in light of our theoretical model, the 
socially preferable contractual design would be to make the private provider bear 
demand risk. As a matter of fact, it can be considered that the social gain to have a 
school catering of good quality is very high. The main argument relies on public health 
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considerations as junk food is now considered as a main cause of health disease. This 
means that the benefits from adaptation are high and that it is preferable that the private 
provider, rather than the public authority, bears demand risk. In addition, there are 
alternative possibilities for parents to get their children lunch (e.g. lunch at home or 
home-made lunch at school). If demand risk would have been on the private provider, 
our model predicts that adaptation would have been more likely implemented. However, 
it is important to note that in the case of universities, I can speculate that putting 
demand on the private provider would be less likely socially preferable. This is due to 
the fact that the considerations of healthy consequences of junk food on the growing of 
students would be less important. 
This logic also applies in the following case of the London Underground Public 
Private Partnership. 
London Underground PPP  
The London Underground Public Private Partnership is a long-term PFI contract that 
provides for maintenance and upgrading work of the London underground (trains, 
tracks, signalling and stations). This is a thirty-year, £30bn contract between London 
Underground Limited and the main private service provider Metronet. Metronet holds 
two of the three thirty-year contracts to maintain track and trains covering the London 
underground network. One contract covers the Bakerloo, Central, Victoria and Waterloo 
& City deep-level Tube lines; the other covers the Metropolitan, District, Circle and 
other sub-surface lines that run in shallow tunnels. The service provider took over 
responsibility for the lines in April 2003. It followed a competitive process whereby the 
contract was awarded to the qualified bidder offering the specified service at the lowest 
price (availability charge). Monthly payment to Metronet derives from a performance 
adjusted Infrastructure Service Charge (ISC). In other words, the payment to Metronet, 
for the first period of the contract (the contract is divided in 4 periods of 7,5 years), is 
composed of a fixed ISC (94,6 per cent of the revenues determined for the first period) 
and of performance revenues (that account for 5,4 per cent of the revenues determined 
for the first period of the contract). The performance revenues depend on the execution 
of the renewal works. They are determined according to the statistics of incidents and 
performance of the two last years preceding the contract. There are four criteria:  
(+) Capability: technical capability of the lines, maximal capacity to reduce the 
durations of the trips; 
(+) Availability: time lost by users (trains speed reduction);  
(+) Ambience: global service quality perceived by, assessed by independent surveys; 
(-) Service points and Specific Projects: penalties are applied in case of failure to 
meet the specified standards (regarding mainly trains delayed). 
75 per cent of the performance revenues stem from technical improvements 
(Capability). 
Moreover, in case of disputes, the contract specifies the intervention of an 
independent “Statutory Arbiter”, designated by the Secretary of State.  
The extent of Metronet's problems has been clear since November 2006, when the 
arbiter of the PPP contract said he expected the company to overspend by £750m in the 
first 7½ years of its contract, up to October 2010. Mr Livingstone, London’s Mayor, has 
for long assumed that London Underground would end up paying none of the £750m of 
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overspending. Yet, Metronet is moving closer to initiating a formal independent review 
to decide who pays for a projected £750m cost overrun. Andrew Lezala, of Metronet 
Rail, went on: ‘I respect the fact that there are large sums involved here and we are quite 
prepared to go through the extraordinary review process, and that's quite likely’ (Robert 
Wright, April 25 2007).   
Whereas the grounds of this overspending are not clear, this case however highlights 
the fact that, in the framework of availability contracts, when there are problems 
regarding the service provision (not only regarding contractually unanticipated service 
adaptation), it is very difficult for the procuring authority to reach an agreement with the 
private provider (in line with Proposition 2 of the model). In this particular case, the 
private provider is not afraid to face a long settlement of dispute and huge costs. I could 
however imagine that if demand risk was on Metronet, users would have been able to 
sanction Metronet for delivering a service of bad quality (the availability of alternative 
providers is significant for urban local transport), and hence empowered London 
Underground in the negotiation process.  
These two cases well illustrate the consequences of a contract in which demand risk 
is on the public authority on incentives. However, as they are failures, our predictions 
regarding the socially preferable contract remain speculative. In the following 
subsection, I will consider a success story, though it does not concern a local public 
service, that will allow us to compare our theoretical predictions with the observed 
contractual choice. 
The Highway Case: The Episode of the ‘Shipwrecked Men of the Road’  
In France, the provision of highways is made through concession contracts. On January 
4, 2003, the French Weather-Forecaster underestimated the extent of the falls of snow 
which will fall down on the French North and Centre. As a consequence, the concerned 
private provider did not take all the necessary measures to preserve the viability of the 
base joint of two highways. Thus, when plates of glaze appeared on this base joint, 
already dense circulation became completely blocked. The absence of measures such as 
the diversion of traffic and information of the users by the private provider increased the 
number of users blocked out of 60 km. After this event, there was a public discontent 
about the lack of suitable means in case of considerable falls of snow. As a 
consequence, as required by the French government, the private provider invested in 
less heavy salting vehicles as well as in automatic salting systems located in crucial 
points. 
Thus, in contrast with the former cases, this case study highlights the fact that under a 
concession contract, in case of changing public demand or problems, service adaptation 
can occur. This is in line with Proposition 1 ( ACCC ii  ). In addition, in the case of 
highways, the potential sanction power of consumers is large, as there are always 
alternative providers and as - and this is particularly true for the road sector - a marginal 
variation in the demand can be sufficient to generate negative profits for the private 
provider.  
Note that in all the case studies presented here, either benefits from adaptation are 
important or benefits from cost-reducing efforts are weak, so that it is in all situations 
socially preferable to design a contract in which demand risk is on the private provider. 
Again, this does not imply that the model of the concession contract is always optimal, 
as speculated in the case of universities catering. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have studied the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability 
of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demands, as well as on the cost-
reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. Thus, not only private 
providers, but also public authorities, can be expropriated ex post of a part of the surplus 
generated by their efforts. 
The model shows that the contract form in which the private provider bears demand 
risk always dominates the one in which it does not bear demand risk regarding the 
incentives given to procuring authorities to be responsive to consumers concerns.  
As for the incentives given to the private provider to reduce costs, it is in turn the 
contract form in which the private provider does not bear demand risk that always 
dominates. A tradeoff occurs then between imposing demand risk on the private 
provider to raise the accountability of procuring authorities, and not imposing demand 
risk on the private provider to raise his cost-cutting incentives. Thus, contracts in which 
the private provider bears demand risk are more likely to be preferred (a) the greater the 
benefits from adaptation (and the greater the potential impact of the consumers pressure 
on the private provider’s remuneration); (b) the weaker the positive effect of cost-
reducing efforts. 
The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, it puts the emphasis on the political 
accountability, so far neglected, in the alignment on service provision preferences. It 
sheds some insights on the impact of the contractual design of Public Private 
Partnerships on this accountability mechanism and questions the trend towards the 
greater resort to contracts where firms bear little or no demand risk around the world. 
Second, it contributes to the broader literature on the political economy of government 
responsiveness. It is in fact related to the literature on voucher provision of public 
services and demonstrates that empowering consumers of public services strengthens 
incentives for governments to be responsive. 
 
Notes 
1 The contract is assumed to be incomplete in the sense that the builder can modify the nature of the 
infrastructure services in various ways, without violating the contract (Hart 2003). 
2 Iossa and Martimort (2008) distinguish three types of PPP contract, depending on whether the payment 
is based on (i) user charges, (ii) usage, or on (iii) availability. In the first case, the private provider bears 
all demand risk. In the second case, the allocation of demand risk depends on the relationship between the 
payment and the actual usage level. In the third case, the public authority retains all demand risk. It is in 
fact contractually possible to restrict the demand risk imposed on the private provider within a concession 
contract (Athias and Saussier, 2007), and, as a consequence, public authorities do not face a binary choice 
of contracts but a continuum choice. Whereas in this paper I focus only on the two extreme contractual 
forms, considering a continuum choice of contracts does not question the results I obtained to the extent 
that the weaker the extent to which the private provider bears demand risk, the weaker the potential 
impact of the consumers pressure on its remuneration, everything else being equal. 
3 There is one exception with the case of prisons where the private provider obviously cannot bear 
demand risk. 
4 Since in both contractual designs, PM  has control rights over the service provision, e  will be 
implemented unilaterally. 
5 I assume in this paper that the private provider has no private gains from implementing the adaptation, 
i.e. the private provider’s adaptation incentives would not vary with the contractual design structures I 
analyse.  
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6 Thus, following Hart-Shleifer-Vishny (1997), I assume that the public authority does not maximize the 
global surplus during renegotiations: its utility function is given by the welfare of the rest of society, 
excluding the private operator. A justification for this is that the political process aligns the public 
authority’s and society’s interests (since the private operator has negligible voting power, his interests 
receive negligible weight). Of course, if the government placed the same weight on the private operator’s 
utility as on the rest of society, the first-best could be achieved. 
7 I assume that 'PM ’s additional cost of providing the adapted service is the same as for PM . 
Furthermore, I assume competition is such that PA  needs only to compensate 'PM ’s costs. 
8 Recall that )(iv  is PA ’s net benefit, i.e. entails the provider’s costs of adaptation.   
9 Note that it is not necessary that the alternative provisions are adapted to consumers preferences. 
Consumers can in fact decide to switch to an alternative provision that can even less match their 
preferences, so as to sanction PM . 
10 I abstract from the transaction costs of designing an availability contract compared to a concession 
contract, which when λ = 1 would favour the concession contract.  
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APPENDIX 
A. Proof of Proposition 1 
 The first-order condition when the private provider bears the demand risk is   
                              , or, equivalently, 2))((')2(   ivk . 
 
Taking the derivative with respect to λ yields 0))((')('))(('')2(   ikviivk  
Rearranging and solving for )(' i :  
 
 
Since v  is concave as well as 10    and 10  k , the denominator is always 
negative and the numerator is always positive. Therefore, )(' i  is always negative.  
 
B. Proof of Proposition 2 
The first-order condition when the private provider bears the demand risk is   
                              , or, equivalently, 2))((')1(   ew . 
 
Taking the derivative with respect to λ yields 0))((')('))(('')1(   eweew  
Rearranging and solving for )(' e :  
 
 
Since w  is concave as well as 10   , the denominator is always negative and the 
numerator is always negative. Therefore, )(' e  is always positive.  
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